


# **The US - New Zealand Relations in the Post-Cold War Era and Recommendations for New Zealand's Foreign Policy**



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## **Abstract**

*New Zealand and the United States are close strategic partners. The two countries share a deep and longstanding friendship, united by a commitment to promote a free, democratic, secure and prosperous world. This article explores the relations between the two countries in the post-Cold War Era. The examination is critical and has implications for New Zealand to maintain an independent foreign policy to protect its own sovereign interests while balancing economic security and maintaining a productive and respectful relationship with a great power like the US.*

**Keywords:** *The US, New Zealand, Relations, Post-Cold War Era, New Zealand's Policy.*

## **I. Introduction**

New Zealand is a strong, steadfast partner and friend of the United States. The U.S. diplomatic presence in New Zealand dates back to the commissioning of the first U.S. Consul in 1838. Formal diplomatic relations were established in 1942, following the United Kingdom's recognition of New Zealand's domestic and external autonomy within the British Empire. The United States and New Zealand share common elements of history and culture and a commitment to democratic principles and the international rules-based order. Bilateral ties between the United States and New Zealand are broad and robust. The New Zealand Government attaches significant importance to continued close political, economic, and social ties with the United States. New Zealand actively engages in peacekeeping and international security efforts around the world. The United States and New Zealand work together on a range of scientific areas, especially research in Antarctica. The article discusses how New Zealand can continue to have positive relations with the US. The article starts by looking at the foundation of the US – New Zealand Relations. Second, the evolution of US – New Zealand in the post-Cold War era is taken into account. Third, the challenge of US – New Zealand relations is discussed and suggestions are made regarding New Zealand's foreign policy towards the US.

## **II. Research Methodology**

The paper uses two research methods: descriptive statistical research method and analytical-synthesis method to trace New Zealand's relations with the US in the post-Cold War era, discuss the challenges in the US – New Zealand relations, and some suggestions for New Zealand's foreign policy in the context of the changing global order, especially in the Asia Pacific region.

## **III. Research Results**

### **The foundation of US – New Zealand Relations**

New Zealand and the US have historically shared a dedication to democracy and the rule of law. The "Five Eyes" partnership, which is run by the National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States in close coordination with partner intelligence agencies in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), and New Zealand. The UKUSA Agreement, which was signed in 1946, called for cooperation between the USA and the UK in gathering and sharing signals information. New Zealand joined in 1956. ECHELON is a surveillance network that was created by the Five Eyes nations to track the military and diplomatic communications of the Soviet Union and its allies in the Eastern Bloc. By the conclusion of the Cold War, the ECHELON monitoring network had developed into an international system that could intercept a significant quantity of private communications, such as

phone conversations, faxes, emails, and other data traffic (European Parliament doc). The ECHELON system was created by the NSA to connect the Five Eyes alliance's information gathering mechanism. This means that a sizable portion of the information gathered by the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) is forwarded directly to the agency's headquarters rather than being vetted in New Zealand.

The close relationship between the US and New Zealand started as a result of military fears and was disrupted by military differences. The British government informed New Zealand in June 1940 that American protection of British interests in the Pacific would be necessary in the event of war, which would also affect New Zealand. The idea that the country's defense and security would be supported by a strong American presence in the Pacific region and a close military alliance between the two countries was one that New Zealand stressed more or less during the course of the following years.

Formal security treaty arrangements were made through the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and United States) Treaty (1951) and the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty (1954). New Zealand troops participated in combat as allies of the United States in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s and in Korea in the 1950s. Early in the 1970s, ANZUS was referred to as the "keystone of New Zealand's security" in government documents - the review of Defence Policy in 1972. From that time until the beginning of the 1980s, it was widely believed in New Zealand (at least in official circles) that the nation's security was based on its alliance with the United States.

The belief that the country's security interests necessitated a robust US presence in the Pacific region and close military connections with Washington was one that New Zealand governments shared during the majority of the Cold War. Here, ties between the US and New Zealand appeared to follow the traditional path of the small state allied to a great power patron.

However, New Zealand's awareness of itself as a sovereign nation had deepened and grown by the early 1980s. Forced to deal with the consequences of Britain joining what was then the European Economic Community in January 1973, New Zealand expanded markets and trade links, notably in Australia, the US and Japan. This coincided with the rise of an active local peace movement that focused on a long-held antipathy to nuclear weapons. With the growth of a middle-class peace movement in New Zealand and the election in 1984 of a government with many members who had been active in the anti-Vietnam War movement, that consensus started to crumble in the early 1980s.

Peace movement activists concentrated on New Zealand's long-standing opposition to nuclear weapons and a residual anti-American sentiment. (Antinuclear sentiments had been present since at least the mid-1960s, when a petition to promote a Southern Hemisphere nuclear free zone had attracted 80,000 signatures). Activists launched a grassroots effort to compel the government to forbid any nuclear-powered or armed warships (these vessels being symbolic of the treaty) from entering New Zealand ports even for routine training and recreation visits.

Although it did not entirely agree with the activists' viewpoints, the government determined in 1985 that a warship may only enter New Zealand seas if it was certified as "not carrying nuclear weapons" in response to a formal request from the United States. The visit was cancelled because it would have gone against long-standing U.S. policy to neither confirm nor deny the existence of nuclear weapons. Subsequent negotiations did not resolve the issue, and when New Zealand's parliament started debating the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Disarmament and Arms Control Bill in 1986 (which prohibited both nuclear propulsion and nuclear weapons), the United States declared New Zealand to be "a friend but not an ally" on the grounds that (effectively) barring U.S. warships from New Zealand's waters was not in line with the spirit of the ANZUS Treaty.

The United States immediately cut off all regular military training ties with New Zealand for people and units, stopped providing military intelligence to New Zealand, and refused to take part in multilateral military exercises in which New Zealand would have taken part. Despite those measures, New Zealand did not alter its policy because it understood that the policy differences prevented comprehensive military cooperation between the United States and New Zealand. The bombing of the Greenpeace vessel, the Rainbow Warrior, in Auckland harbour in 1985 by French government agents

further reinforced a New Zealand determination to assert a degree of national independence in its security and foreign policy.

As a result, New Zealand chose a route that would reduce its risk. Rather than push for any resumption of routine military links, New Zealand began to work diplomatically to reassure the United States and other friendly states that New Zealand had not suddenly changed its world outlook on fundamental foreign policy issues. To reinforce this, New Zealand continued to cooperate militarily with the United States and other Western partners in a range of peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Balkans.

### **The Evolution of US – New Zealand Relations in the Post-Cold War Era**

#### **Political-Strategic and Security Connections**

The parameters of bilateral relations between New Zealand and the US have changed as a result of the Cold War's aftershocks and deepening globalization-a process of revolutionary change in the fields of information and communications technology that appeared to make the world a much more interconnected place.

The multinational peace operations of the early post-Cold War era seemed to be in line with established New Zealand policy, such as strong support for the United Nations. Similar to this, New Zealand's non-nuclear position, which might have appeared idealistic in the middle of the 1980s, had a more realistic color after the Cold War as fears about nuclear proliferation spread around the world. The post-Cold War environment also supported Wellington's commercial and diplomatic push into the vibrant Asia-Pacific region and sat well with New Zealand's liberalized economy.

Beginning in the early 1990s, governments led by the National and Labour parties followed a two-track policy toward the US. This essentially meant that New Zealand governments worked to improve their relations with Washington on the political and economic fronts, while openly acknowledging that there were significant differences between Wellington's anti-nuclear legislation and its non-nuclear security strategy. It was believed that through bridging the political and economic divide between the two nations, some favorable impacts on military relations may come about without upending New Zealand's non-nuclear status quo.

This strategy had mixed results in the 1990s. The sociocultural and economic ties between the two nations certainly deepened, but the basic nuclear dispute persisted. The persistence of this dispute was due both to the consolidation of domestic support in New Zealand for a non-nuclear defence policy, and the reluctance by successive administrations in Washington to recognise that the security environment of the post-Cold War world had changed the political terms of the original disagreement between New Zealand and the US.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., however, gave New Zealand the chance to revitalize its two-track strategy for relations with Washington. Helen Clark's Labour-led administration responded to 9/11 in a prompt but considered manner. In addition to promising backing for the Bush administration's new fight on terror, it also offered urgent material aid by sending an SAS unit and a peace reconstruction team to Afghanistan.

The Bush administration acknowledged New Zealand's commitment to the fight against terrorism. Prime Minister Helen Clark visited Washington in March 2002 and was cordially welcomed by President Bush and Colin Powell, who was the US secretary of state at the time.

However, the Clark administration did not support the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 despite its ardent support for the fight against terrorism. While the then-US ambassador to New Zealand, Charles Swindells, expressed public regret for the Clark administration's stance, Prime Minister Clark robustly argued that an attack on Iraq without the UN Security Council's approval would undermine international law and strengthen the hands of terrorist groups like al Qaeda.

Future developments in Iraq, and in particular rising anti-war sentiment in the US, only served to increase the momentum of the Clark government's two-track strategy towards the US. The 2005 general election served as somewhat of a reality check for Washington if it still thought it could set the parameters for the renewal of the US- New Zealand partnership. The outgoing US ambassador, Charles Swindells, issued a warning ahead of the September election that the political impact from the two countries' nuclear dispute could worsen.

The Clark administration, however, firmly disagreed with Swindells' pessimistic assessment and effectively used the patriotic card throughout the election campaign to claim that only Labour could be relied upon to withstand US pressure and uphold the prohibition on nuclear ships. Such occurrences supported the main lesson of 9/11. Even the only superpower in the world, the United States, was vulnerable in an increasingly globalized world and could not realistically overcome its problems without significant international assistance and cooperation. By 2006, the second Bush administration had finally come to terms with the fact that mending the nuclear divide should no longer be a barrier to closer ties with New Zealand.

The US reevaluation was driven by four factors. First, the Bush administration has come to terms with the fact that today's world is very different from that of the Cold War era, when the US and New Zealand had a dispute over nuclear policy. Second, the Bush administration, which was extremely concerned about terrorist organizations gaining access to weapons of mass destruction after 9/11, gave greater weight to New Zealand's reputation as a devoted and ardent proponent of non-proliferation. Third, the Bush administration had new reasons to improve relations with a small, democratic, and friendly nation like New Zealand because of the sharp loss in its international standing following the invasion of Iraq and the well-documented human rights abuses. Fourth, US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and New Zealand's former foreign minister Winston Peters had a great working relationship, and it was during Ms. Rice's visit to Wellington in 2008 that she proclaimed New Zealand to be an ally as well as a friend of the US.

During the two terms of the Obama administration, from 2009 to 2016, collaboration between the United States and New Zealand on security and international affairs significantly increased. The Wellington and Washington statements of 2010 and 2012 provided the clearest indication of strengthened security collaboration. The two states' enhanced strategic alliance in the Asia-Pacific area was made official by these events. This cooperation was characterized by a rise in high-level political discussions, joint military exercises between the US and New Zealand, enhanced intelligence sharing, and a number of initiatives to work together on emerging issues like maritime security and cyber security.

The Asia-Pacific region was a key strategic issue for the Obama administration at the same time. President Obama announced a "pivot to Asia" or rebalancing strategy in a speech to the Australian Parliament in Canberra in late 2011. The initiative vowed to strengthen Washington's military presence in the Asia-Pacific and reaffirmed America's commitment to continuing to be an anchor of stability and prosperity in this region. More than 70% of New Zealand's trade and investment were concentrated in the area. The security relationship's breach was mostly restored, even though the ANZUS connection between New Zealand and the US has not yet been totally restored. New Zealand joined the US-led anti-ISIS coalition in September 2014 along with more than 60 other nations. In February 2015, Wellington sent 143 military personnel to Iraq to assist in the training of Iraq's government forces in the fight against ISIS. When the Obama administration was getting ready to leave office in 2016, relations between New Zealand and the United States were at their highest point since the ANZUS split in the mid-1980s.

The election of Donald Trump as president in November 2016 represents a significant difference from the foreign policy of the Obama administration and preceding administrations. Possibly the most important policy element of Trump's election campaign was opposition to globalization. The Trump campaign questioned the role of multilateral institutions, and looked to reverse the effects of globalisation, particularly in relation to immigration, trade and global governance.

In February 2017, President Trump called Bill English, who was the prime minister at the time, and a 15- minute talk regarding trade, national security, and New Zealand's role in the fight against the Islamic State. The conversation remained "warm and thoughtful," in the words of the Prime Minister of New Zealand, and finished with an agreement in principle to meet in person. English went on to voice disapproval of Trump's executive order banning travel from seven countries with a majority of Muslims. That meeting never happened, but in June 2017, Rex Tillerson, a former US secretary of state, made a quick trip to New Zealand. He highlighted that Washington was "truly thankful of New Zealand's troops in the Middle East and this extremely vital role they're playing to

train security forces" and expressed his joy at being able to "reaffirm the great cooperation between the United States and New Zealand" [8]. After the September 2017 general election and the formation of a Labour-led coalition government in New Zealand, President Trump was quick to ring new Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern. The two leaders had a brief informal face-to-face meeting at the APEC summit in November 2017. The two leaders presented contrasting worldviews in their addresses to the UN General Assembly in late September 2018 but the New Zealand Prime Minister was careful to avoid public criticism of President Trump's speech there. The Trump administration's nomination of Scott Brown as America's ambassador to New Zealand. Ambassador Brown said he is working hard to enhance the "fantastic relationship" between the two countries. Working with New Zealand diplomats, Ambassador Brown was able to get support in 2018 for a bill so that the US Congress facilitate the provision of what is called the E1, E2 visa in commercial bilateral relations to eligible New Zealanders. Based on their investments in the US, the visas enable corporate executives to live and work there. And Ambassador Brown has urged New Zealanders to acknowledge President Trump's "achievements in office."

The membership of New Zealand in the Five Eyes has continued to be supported by successive elected administrations in Wellington. The New Zealand governments likely assumed they would not otherwise have access to as much information on which to base their own choices. The adoption of a non-nuclear security policy by New Zealand in the middle of the 1980s was not hindered by its membership in the Five Eyes alliance. New Zealand felt free to object to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq at the same time. And the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Jacinda Ardern, made it clear right away after entering office that she shared the viewpoint of her predecessors on the Five Eyes alliance's membership by announcing that her country would continue to be a part of this intelligence-sharing group to struggle against terrorism and to counter foreign interference activities (Five Country Ministerial, 2018).

### **Economic and Scientific Links**

The US and New Zealand are at the opposing extremes of the economic and market spectrum, but in the era of globalization, the two nations' economic orientations have come closer together. New Zealand's economy was liberalized in the 1980s, bringing it closer to the long-promised American goals of free trade and the removal of protectionist obstacles. Both nations strongly supported and promoted the World Trade Organization (WTO), a multilateral organization that took over from GATT as the watchdog of global trade regulations in 1995. Since then, the WTO has created comprehensive regulations for regulating trade, including the provision of a historically binding trade dispute resolution process that has the ability to supersede the state sovereignty of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

Since the middle of the 1990s, has successfully used the machinery of the WTO to resolve disputes with a number of important trade partners. The partners included The US, the EU, Australia, Canada, and India. In each case, New Zealand was able to resolve the dispute while maintaining favorable relations with all other parties. The WTO's rules-based approach to trade has actually strengthened New Zealand's national sovereignty by leveling the playing field for smaller, less powerful trading nations.

The US was New Zealand's third-largest commercial partner in 2016, and there is still room for growth. The US is a significant market for New Zealand's agricultural products, and it has historically been one of the biggest exporters of beef and edible offal from that nation. However, economic interactions apply to a variety of commercial endeavors. These include the exchange of commodities and services as well as foreign direct investment in a variety of industries.

New Zealand's trade with United States of America								
	Year ended December - \$ million							
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
<b>Total exports</b>								
Total	8,749	8,867	9,408	9,961	10,978	10,549	10,484	12,224
Total goods	5,758	5,299	5,325	5,501	5,622	6,628	6,694	7,818
Total services	2,991	3,569	4,083	4,460	5,356	3,921	3,790	4,405
<b>Total imports</b>								
Total	8,088	8,244	8,644	9,467	9,617	7,829	8,326	10,695
Total goods	5,891	5,574	5,761	6,107	6,128	5,222	5,673	7,239
Total services	2,197	2,670	2,883	3,360	3,489	2,606	2,654	3,455

Table 1 (Source: [https://statisticsnz.shinyapps.io/trade\\_dashboard/](https://statisticsnz.shinyapps.io/trade_dashboard/))

During the period between 2015 and 2022, New Zealand's trade with the US increased dramatically (Table 1). In the year ended December 2022 New Zealand exported \$12.22 billion of total goods and services to United States of America and imported \$10.69 billion, representing a trade balance of \$1.53 billion and a total trade value of \$22.92 billion. This represented 13.6% of all exports of total goods and services in this time period and 10.0% of imports. For trade in total goods and services United States of America ranked 3 of 241 for highest export value, 3 of 239 for highest import value, and 3 of 245 for highest total trade value. It is clearly illustrated through the two graphs below (Table 2 and 3): Top 5 exports destinations and top 5 import origins:

Top 5 export destinations - YE December 2022




Table 2 (Source: [https://statisticsnz.shinyapps.io/trade\\_dashboard/](https://statisticsnz.shinyapps.io/trade_dashboard/))

Top 5 import origins - YE December 2022




Table 3 (Source: [https://statisticsnz.shinyapps.io/trade\\_dashboard/](https://statisticsnz.shinyapps.io/trade_dashboard/))

New or emerging sectors of New Zealand's knowledge economy are also included in the bilateral relationship. A number of New Zealand-based businesses and institutes are attempting to commercialize their intellectual property in ICT, biotech, and clean technology in the US [13], according to the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT).

In Antarctica, New Zealand and the US have also developed strong scientific and logistical ties [14]. Scientists from New Zealand and the US have worked together in some of the most difficult environments on earth for over 50 years. To carry out "Operation Deep Freeze," the US created a logistics center in Christchurch in 1955. Since then, Christchurch has served as a gateway to Antarctica, with participants in the US and New Zealand Antarctic programs sharing the 3920 km to Ross Island, where they have set up permanent outposts for their respective Antarctic programs just 3 km apart. Climate change research is being done in partnership with other scientists in Antarctica. Scientists have gained a better grasp of how greenhouse gases affect global temperatures by examining samples of ancient ice.

### **Socio-cultural Relations**

In a 4 July 2005 speech, the then US Ambassador to New Zealand, Charles Swindells claimed that "the bonds between our peoples are even greater than those between our governments" a view vindicated by the rapid expansion of the people to people contacts that have occurred, particularly during the last three decades. Geography is no longer as much of a barrier as it once was thanks to the decreasing cost of international travel, the constant rise in international phone traffic, and developments in communications technology like the Internet. The number of American visitors that arrived in New Zealand over the course of a year ending in February 2018 was 338,000, or 9% of all foreign arrivals. The third-largest source of foreign arrivals in New Zealand, behind travelers from Australia and China, was Americans. During the same period, New Zealanders traveling abroad ranked America second after Australia in terms of popularity.

The US has long maintained a large cultural profile in New Zealand due to its sheer size, shared language, and significant soft power. American dominance in the popular entertainment, journalism, and global film industries all contribute to ensuring that the United States, its way of life, and its national superstars and icons all receive significant exposure in New Zealand. However, in recent decades, this disparity started to lessen. The main people responsible for enhancing New Zealand's reputation in the US were New Zealand actors like Sam Neill and filmmakers like Peter Jackson and Roger Donaldson. In the US, movies with overtly New Zealand-related themes and links have done rather well.

## **The Future of the US – New Zealand Relations: Challenges and some Implications for New Zealand Foreign Policy**

### **Challenges for the US – New Zealand Relations**

The worldview of New Zealand, which is strongly rooted in multilateralism and a rules-based international system, and the "America-First" foreign policy stance of the Trump administration appear to be fundamentally at odds with one another. Since the 1980s, successive New Zealand governments have typically seen globalization as an irreversible structural transformation that has helped advance the nation's interests and values in organizations like the United Nations and principles like multilateralism. The Trump administration, in contrast, has frequently stressed its opposition to multilateralism and globalization the new international order should, in the view of Trump, be built on the ostensible self-balancing struggle of independent nation-states. According to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, it envisions a society in which "the strong rule where they may and the poor endure what they must."

The adoption of a non-nuclear security strategy, the promotion of New Zealanders to positions of leadership in international institutions, the effective use of the WTO in trade disputes, New Zealand's refusal to support the US-led invasion of Iraq, and the development of close ties with the two superpowers of the world, America and China, all indicate that globalization has increased New Zealand's international reach.

More precisely, three facets of New Zealand's foreign policy position have been impacted by the Trump administration's initial acts. First, Trump's brand of nationalism seems to have weakened America's commitment to international human rights and the rule of law at a time when New Zealand has redefined itself in the world by recognizing the special constitutional and cultural position of Maori people and strengthening ties with the Asia-Pacific. Reduced immigration, the pledge to construct a border wall with Mexico, and the repeal of the Affordable Health Care Act have all been criticized as harsh, xenophobic, and racist policies.

Second, all New Zealand governments have regarded trade liberalization as a key component in boosting the country's economic growth and prosperity since a program of radical reform in the mid-1980s had made New Zealand's economy one of the most open in the developed world. The Trump administration does not appear to share this objective. Washington announced its exit from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in January 2017 (TPP). President Trump has stated that international FTAs like TPP hurt America and only result in the outsourcing of US employment to partner nations, citing the NAFTA example. Third, the advent of the Trump administration has the potential to complicate New Zealand's much improved security relationship with the US. Former Prime Minister Bill English supported President Trump's use of 59 missiles against the Assad regime in April following its illegal use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war. A year later, and shortly after Mr. Trump said America would be leaving Syria, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said she "accepts" the use of more than 100 American missiles against facilities belonging to the Assad regime in the wake of the alleged use of chemical weapons again during the civil war in Syria. At the same time, New Zealand's National-led and Labour-led governments have both applauded signs of greater co-ordination between President Trump and China's President Xi Jinping in curbing the nuclear weapons ambitions of Kim Jong-un's regime in North Korea, but also expressed strong political reservations about Trump's somewhat erratic policy towards North Korea.

Trump's utter determination to maintain "American First" foreign policy sparked a potentially dangerous trade war with China and caused open scenes of diplomatic conflict between the US and China. Although New Zealand has always walk a fine line in maintaining excellent relations with both the US and China, that task could become significantly more challenging during a time of confrontation when both superpowers may demand loyalty and support from nations like New Zealand.

### **Some Implications for New Zealand Foreign Policy towards the US**

The foreign policy differences between New Zealand governments and the US highlight a basic gulf in understanding of the contemporary global order. In the post-Cold War era, New Zealand administrations have a tendency to regard globalization as a permanent structural change in the globe that is characterized by immediate communications and cross-border financial transactions that makes all sovereign nations more interconnected and vulnerable than before. According to this perspective, the current condition of the world order cannot be evaluated just in terms of the international context in which all nations and other actors are situated.

First, New Zealand should not abandon its core foreign policy beliefs publicly articulated during its successful campaign for a 2-year term on the United Nations Security Council in October 2014 and reiterated by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern. As a small and developed state, New Zealand has generally been successful at maximizing the benefits and minimizing the drawbacks of a globalizing world through the use of its commitment to an autonomous foreign policy. This has been proved in the past in New Zealand's relations with the US and China, Wellington should keep diversifying its efforts to expand its relationships, especially in the Asia Pacific. Wellington has signed FTAs with 16 states in this economically dynamic region up to now. However, there is still room to strengthen ties with nations like India, Indonesia, Japan, and Canada. Such diversification helps to prevent a New Zealand fixation with the US-China relationship.

There are many similarities between the US and New Zealand as two nations. Therefore, it is crucial that New Zealand maintains a close and respectful diplomatic dialogue with the US, even if occasionally Wellington must openly admit policy differences with the Trump administration or publicly criticize some of its acts. In other words, New Zealand policy needs to take into account the

fact that America was an important partner of New Zealand and is likely to remain one. It makes sense for New Zealand to pursue a two-track policy approach towards the US. On one hand, New Zealand needs to be very clear that it wants to work hard to find areas of agreement with Washington and that it wants to have a friendly and productive relationship with them. Wellington, on the other hand, should forcefully defend its support for fundamental foreign policy objectives like multilateralism and a rules-based international system.

New Zealand must do more than simply defend the rules-based multilateral system. The focus also must be on strategically identifying elements of the liberal order that need to be reformed and strengthened. The liberal order could be strengthened by two kinds of reforms. First, until the P-5 group loses the right to veto any Council decision they disagree with, it is unlikely that the situation in terms of global security would improve. The devastating seven-year civil war in Syria serves as a reminder that the UNSC is powerless to provide justice or stability to regions. The P-5 group's veto authority ought to be eliminated or severely limited. Second, it is time for a serious international debate on how the liberal economic system can be made to work better for more people. 85 billionaires have almost as much wealth as half the world's population is not morally acceptable or politically sustainable.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

The relations between the United States and New Zealand are multifaceted in different areas: A shared long lasting history of security cooperation, political-strategic connections, economic and scientific links and socio-cultural relations. Therefore, it is important for New Zealand to maintain an excellent relation with the US – a superpower of the world. However, there are certain challenges for the US – New Zealand relations and we are all living a world where all countries, including the US, are currently dealing with economic, security, and environmental issues that transcend national borders and cannot be solved by a single state acting alone. New Zealand should follow an independent foreign policy which maximize the benefits and minimize the drawbacks of a globalizing world.

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